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Three short years ago, when the U.S.
economy was still in its “jobless
recovery” from the 2001 recession, a
hullabaloo erupted over the foreign
“outsourcing” of services.  Once the
economy began expanding, however,
offshore outsourcing lost some of its
power as a bogey man.  Yet politi-
cians still inveigh against it in their
quests for votes, reflecting the linger-
ing conviction by fully three-quarters
of the public that it’s bad for America.
Offshore outsourcing—hereafter,
offshoring—is but one manifestation
of the terrible, swift sword of global-
ization driving competition, and pro-
ductivity, throughout the world econ-
omy.  As such, it generates significant
gains for the economy of the nation
and, with it, that of Connecticut.  So
it’s important to resist the forces trying
to check its progress.
At the same time, there is a central
truth behind the resistance:
Offshoring (like breaking eggs for a
delicious omelet) imposes adjustment
costs—layoffs, and the need to re-
hone job skills or acquire new ones,
perhaps even to relocate—on some
workers and firms.  The complete eco-
nomic argument for keeping the
national economy open is that we can
compensate any losers out of the gains
but still come out ahead.  Failing to
make the compensation will only
strengthen the resistance and hence
jeopardize the efficiency gains.
The skills of its workers and a
strong education system kept the
Connecticut economy resilient as it
lost its edge in old-line manufacturing.
But nowadays galloping technological
change in communications is exposing
an ever-widening circle of Connect-
icut’s higher-tech jobs to foreign com-
petition.  Trying to prevent firms from
making use of cheaper offshore servic-
es would just drive them—and their
jobs—out of the state.  But that’s not
to say that Connecticut companies,
unions and public officials should sit
idly and watch their jobs flow abroad.
We have ways to meet this new chal-
lenge, but the time to act is now.
LEST WE FORGET
The Nutmeg State’s ties to the
international economy go way back.
Since early days, Connecticut has
looked abroad for workers, know-how,
capital, and markets.  Even with the
unrelenting decline of manufacturing
employment, our state still exports a
lot of high-end manufactured
goods—industrial machinery, optical
and other precision gear, electrical
machinery, and aircraft products, to
name just the top dogs.  But modern-
day Connecticut also is a leading pro-
ducer of many exportable services
(information, education and finan-
cial).  And our state continues to
attract investment by foreign firms
seeking access to our R&D capabilities
and skilled workforce.  
Connecticut also has a broader
stake in the international economy.
The main driver of state output and
job growth is national economic per-
formance, and the health of the U.S.
economy depends to an increasing
degree on international trade and
finance.  Hence, anti-offshoring policy
measures would just shoot
Connecticut and the U.S. in the foot,
hobbling their other efforts to capital-
ize on the growing internationalization
of the nation’s economy.
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LESS FEAR BUT STILL PLENTY OF LOATHING
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Offshoring generates 
significant gains 
for the economy.  
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OFFSHORING DECONSTRUCTED
Offshoring refers to hiring from
abroad what American-based firms
used to do themselves or contract for
(“outsource”) at home.  To economists,
it is merely an extension of good old-
fashioned Ricardian comparative
advantage, where (in the early 19th
century) the British produced cloth to
trade for Portuguese wine. The far
lower transportation and communica-
tions costs of today have opened up
trade in intermediate products and
services.  So scholars like Gene
Grossman and Esteban Rossi-
Hansberg at Princeton now spin tales
about trading tasks rather than the fin-
ished goods of David Ricardo’s famous
example.  Increasingly, it pays to con-
tract with foreign producers to per-
form many service tasks.
For example, as shown in the side-
bar, estimates by analysts at McKinsey
& Company report that, for every
$1.00 of domestic cost moved offshore
(to India in their reckoning), compa-
nies save $0.58, holding constant the
quality of the services (http://mckin-
sey.com/mgi/reports/pdfs/rethink-
ing/).   Using micro-level data, Christ-
opher Johann Kurz of the Federal
Reserve Board staff has found that
offshoring firms are significantly larger,
more capital intensive, and more pro-




Taking advantage of offshoring
opportunities is also good for the econ-
omy as a whole.  The McKinsey study
in my illustration found an additional
benefit to the U.S. of $0.54: $0.05 in
U.S. exports to India, plus $0.04 in
repatriated profits from U.S. foreign
investments, plus $0.45 in output pro-
duced by re-employed labor (assuming
only partial rehiring).  That pushes the
gross gain from the offshoring of a dol-
lar’s worth of services to India of
$1.12.  Also, Mary Amiti and Shang-
Jin Wei at the International Monetary
Fund, again using American firm-level
data, reported in a December 2005
working paper that offshoring services
accounted for about one-eighth of the




Trouble is, the wonderfully pro-
ductive global economy can be a bit
too much like a friendly 800-pound
gorilla—strong, to be sure, and fun to
horse around with, but occasionally
some playmates may get hurt.
The downside of U.S. firms’ hav-
ing service tasks done abroad is the
destruction of jobs performing those
same tasks in the U.S.—the $1.00 of
services in the illustration.  Brad Jensen
and Lori Kletzer, writing in the 2005
Brookings Trade Forum, point out that
tradable service jobs tend to be higher-
skilled than non-tradable jobs.  Jensen
and Kletzer find a distinct “rise in the
probability of job loss for more-educat-
ed workers” (page 76).  To be sure, jobs
in tradable services fetch earnings pre-
mia over those in non-tradable servic-
es, but many workers displaced from
tradable-service jobs wind up taking
new posts at lower earnings—and that,
only after some months of unem-
ployed searching.  In 2001-2003, the
share of IT and financial-professional-
business services in total jobs lost near-
ly tripled—from 15% to 43%—com-
pared with 1979-1982.
Information, financial, profession-
al and business services are right in the
wheelhouse of the modern-day
Connecticut economy.  According to
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
estimates of Connecticut GDP in
2005, the three sectors of “informa-
tion”, “finance and insurance”, and
“professional and technical services”
accounted for better than a quarter of
our total output.  And while
Connecticut has continued to hemor-
rhage manufacturing jobs, growth in
those services sectors has kept the
state’s economy vibrant.  Of our GDP
growth of 3.2% between 2004 and
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Assume that a U.S. company “offshores” $1.00 
worth of U.S. services to India, where the same 
services cost the firm $0.42 (labor, supervision, 
extra transaction costs).       
    
Loss to U.S.                     ($1.00)
Gains to U.S       
  Cost savings       $0.58  
  Increase in Indian exports       
   to  U.S.       0.05   
  Repatriated profits        0.04   
  Value of re-employed labor     0.45 
Total U.S. Gains           1.12  
    
Net gains to U.S.         $0.12  
Gains to India 
           (wages, taxes, profits)       0.33 
Net global gains          $0.45 
    
  
OFFSHORING:
WHO WINS, WHO LOSES?
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2005, the Big Three services sectors
accounted for 1.91 points, or 60%.
LIVE BY THE SWORD, 
DIE BY THE SWORD
So the “terrible, swift sword” of
globalization turns out to be double-
edged: Connecticut’s very strength in
tradable services means that the state is
especially vulnerable to offshoring, and
probably increasingly so as time passes.
Cynthia Kroll, using a simple “loca-
tion quotient” approach, found that,
in 2003, Connecticut was in the top
group of “high-risk” states in “techni-




necticut ranked third among the 50
states in exposure to services off-
shoring, with 13.7% of jobs at risk,
just behind Delaware and Virginia; the
50-state average was 11.7%.  Not sur-
prisingly, Kroll found Hartford and
Fairfield Counties to be among the
most vulnerable metros in the U.S.
because of their concentrations of jobs
in those sectors.
If we’d rather live by the sword to
continue to reap the benefits of off-
shoring, Connecticut policy makers
(in league with those in other states
and in Washington) need to find ways
to compensate the losers and keep
them from turning into opponents of
free trade and an open economy.
I have to admit that the “fair-
trade” lobby is right on one point:
many of our trading partners (conti-
nental Europe, Japan) need to reduce
their barriers to offshoring their trad-
able service jobs to us.  Diana Farrell
and Jaeson Rosenfeld of the McKinsey
Global Institute, for example, reckon
“that the US could eliminate up to a
third of its current account deficit if
countries in the EU imported as many
services from the US as it imports
from them” (“US Offshoring:
Rethinking the Response”, December
2005, page 9).
Farrell and Rosenfeld, along with
others, recommend a two-pronged
approach to compensating the victims
of services offshoring.  The first prong
is to strengthen and broaden the income
cushion in current policies.  It is wide-
ly acknowledged that the U.S. has by
far the highest re-employment rate for
displaced workers among advanced
countries.  But the U.S. ranks way
behind western Europe in the share of
GDP spent on assistance to displaced
workers—0.5%, compared with 3.1%
in Germany and 3.7% in Denmark.
Conventional unemployment insur-
ance in the U.S. was designed to deal
with business cycles, not foreign com-
petition, and its extension to “trade-
adjustment assistance” has suffered
from political turbulence and chronic
underfunding.  According to Robert
Litan and Lori Kretzer, a mere 4-5% of
the cost savings to U.S. firms from
outsourcing would provide wage
insurance for displaced workers at
70% of lost wages (from time of sever-
ance to re-employment), and cover
health insurance subsidies for two
years into the bargain.  (My illustra-
tion assumes 5% of $0.58, or $0.04.)
The second prong is to better equip
workers to adapt to job loss, and not just
after being displaced but during their
formal educations as well.  Half a cen-
tury ago, graduate engineers began
seeking MBAs to enable them to pur-
sue careers in managing technical busi-
nesses.  Today, systems analysts and
software engineers need business and
people skills to go with their technical
prowess, if they are to survive the off-
shoring of technical services.
Universities have already begun to
offer multidisciplinary training in
“services science”.
Union and corporate leaders
should be involved in both prongs of
this approach—developing the wage
and health-insurance replacement
policies, and designing new training
programs, to avoid the old trap of
offering trade-school courses in disap-
pearing occupations (often taught by
displaced workers).  
Three years ago, the hullabaloo
over offshoring prompted Governor
Rell to establish a “jobs cabinet” that
(among other things) held hearings on
the challenges posed by “outsourcing”.
As the hubbub ebbed, so apparently
did State efforts to keep Connecticut’s
labor force nimble, creative, and
employed.  Perhaps with her recent
landslide endorsement for a full term
in her own right, Governor Rell will
revive her interest in assisting displaced
workers so that they can participate in
the benefits from offshoring instead of
becoming outspoken opponents of it.
Thomas Friedman wrote in his
October 6, 2006, column in the New
York Times: “Business rule No. 1 today
is: Whatever can be done will be done,
by someone, somewhere.  The only
question is whether it will be done by
you or to you.”